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Tax-deferred 40  1  (k) saving plans were the fastest-growing employee benefit 
during the  1980s. Since there are penalties for early withdrawal of  assets in 
401(k) accounts, the contributions to these plans are likely to remain invested 
until workers retire. The growth of 401(k) plans therefore has the potential to 
significantly affect the financial status of future elderly households. 
Tax-deferred  saving accounts, including 401 (k)s, have become an increas- 
ingly significant channel for personal saving in the United States. This trend 
began with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of  1981, which dramatically ex- 
panded eligibility for Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and allowed in- 
dividuals who were also covered by  employer pension plans to contribute to 
these  accounts. By  1985, more than  15 percent of  all taxpayers  made IRA 
contributions totaling more than $38 billion, or nearly one-third of  personal 
saving in the United States. More than 25  percent of  all families had IRAs, 
even though not all of them made contributions in 1985. The 1986 Tax Reform 
Act  limited the scope for tax-deductible  IRA contributions.  These changes 
prompted a sharp decline in the number of IRA contributors, from 15.5 million 
in 1986 to 7.3 million (6.8 percent of tax returns) in 1987. Total IRA contribu- 
tions declined from $38 to $14 billion. 
Like IRAs, 401(k) plans are deferred compensation plans for wage earners, 
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but  unlike  IRAs, they  are provided by  employers. The plans  were  formally 
established by the Revenue Act of 1978, but were rarely used until the Treasury 
Department  issued clarifying rules in 1981. If  provided  by  the employer, the 
40 l(k) plan permits the employee to contribute before-tax dollars to a retire- 
ment account. Taxes are deferred on the part of  income that is contributed to 
the plan. The participant also benefits from tax-free accumulation of the 401(k) 
investment, just as with IRAs, and may obtain additional benefits  if  the em- 
ployer matches part of the employee contribution. Taxes are paid when funds 
are withdrawn from the  account. The Tax  Reform Act of  1986 reduced  the 
annual limit on 401(k) contributions from $30,000 to $7,000 and added non- 
discrimination provisions to prevent plans from providing benefits exclusively 
to high-income  employees. The $7,000 contribution  limit has been  indexed 
since 1988 and is $8,475 for the 199  I  tax year. 
The availability of 401(k)s and participation in them expanded rapidly after 
the 1981 clarifying rules. In 1983, total employment at firms with 401(k) plans 
totaled 7.1 million; by  1988,  the number of workers eligible to participate had 
increased to 27.5 million. The number of participants increased as well, from 
2.7 million in 1983 to 15.7 million in 1988. Almost $40 billion was contributed 
to  401(k)  plans  in  1988, with  an  average  employee  contribution  of  about 
$2,500. Most large firms now have 401(k) plans. A Hewitt Associates (1990) 
survey of 902 major U.S. employers found plans at 92 percent of the firms in 
1989. The recent adoption of 401(k)s has been fastest, however, at small firms: 
a Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company (1988) survey shows that the 
number of small firms offering these plans increased from 8 percent in  1984 
to 36 percent in 1988. 
This chapter provides a systematic analysis of the nature and significance of 
401(k) plans. It is divided into five sections. Section 4.1 describes the structure 
of 401(k) plans, their eligibility rules, contribution limits, and typical balances. 
It presents summary information on 401 (k) eligibility and participation deci- 
sions,  with  particular  attention  to participation  patterns  for those  with  and 
without IRA accounts. Section 4.2 considers the characteristics of 401(k) plans 
in more detail and includes preliminary evidence on employer matching rates 
and withdrawal  provisions. Section 4.3 focuses on the overlap between  IRA 
and 401  (k) eligibility, directly  addressing the extent of  substitution between 
401  (k) and IRA saving and the correspondence between actual saving patterns 
and “rational” patterns. Section 4.4 examines the extent to which 401(k) con- 
tributions represent new saving. The analysis is based on changes over time in 
total assets of 401(k) participants, and on differences between the net worth of 
households eligible for and ineligible for 401(k) plans. The results suggest that 
401(k) plan contributions represent a net addition to saving, rather than trans- 
fers from other stores of  wealth or displacement of other forms of saving. Sec- 
tion 4.5 is a brief conclusion. 107  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
4.1  401(k) Plan Eligibility and Participation 
The probability that an individual contributes  a given amount to a 401(k) 
plan  can be factored  into the product  of  three probabilities:  the probability 
of contributing that amount conditional on participating in a 401(k) plan, the 
probability of  participating given that a plan is available, and the probability 
of being eligible to participate. We analyze each of these probabilities in turn. 
The basic data are from the  1984, 1985, and  1986 panels of the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation  (SIPP). Each panel comprises eight inter- 
view waves administered over two and one-half years. Data from wave 4 of the 
1984 panel cover September-December  1984. Wave 7 of the  1985 panel and 
wave 4 of the  1986 panel cover the period January-April  1987. The same set 
of  questions  about income, assets, and personal  retirement  saving programs 
were asked of  each panel, with one exception: the 1984 panel did not ask for 
the balance held in 401(k) accounts. We present nominal values from each of 
these  surveys below. The consumer price  index rose  5.9 percent  during the 
twenty-eight-month period separating these surveys. 
Five categories of financial assets are distinguished in our analysis: 401(k)s, 
IRAs, all other financial assets (excluding 401(k)s and IRAs), total financial 
assets, and debt. Other financial assets include all liquid assets such as bank 
saving accounts as well as stocks and bonds, although in some cases, we pre- 
sent results excluding stocks and bonds. Total financial assets equal the sum of 
IRAs, 401(k)s (when available), and other financial assets. 
The unit of observation is the household reference person and the reference 
person’s spouse,  if  present.  For  a family  to be  included  in our  sample, the 
household reference person had to be between 25 and 65 years of age, at least 
one member of the family had to be employed, and no member of  the family 
could report self-employment income. The last restriction is necessary because 
in  most  cases  neither  IRAs nor  401(k)s are feasible  options  for the  self- 
employed. 
The SIPP data are supplemented with data from two additional sources. The 
May 1983 and 1988 Current Population Surveys (CPS) provide data on 401(k) 
eligibility  and participation  and on IRA  contributions.  The 1989 Survey  of 
Consumer  Finances  (SCF) provides  information  on  the  characteristics  of 
401(k) plans at the end of  the 1980s. In addition, we have used IRA contribu- 
tion data from the Internal Revenue Service. 
4.1.1 
At the beginning of the  1980s, 401(k) plans were virtually nonexistent. By 
1987, however, one in eight families participated in a 401(k) plan, and one in 
five families were eligible for a plan through an employer. The top panel of 
table 4.1 reports the age and income characteristics of persons eligible for and 
participating  in 401(k) plans  in  1984 and  1987. The proportion  of  families 
contributing to a 401(k) plan increased by 62 percent between  1984 and 1987, 
from 7.7 to 12.5 percent. The percentage whose employers offered such plans 
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Table 4.1  401(k) Eligibility and Participation by Age and Income, 1984 and 
1987 (%) 
401 (k) 
401(k)  Participation  40  I (k)  IRA 
Eligibility  Given Eligibility  Participation  Participation 
Total population 
I984  13.3  58.1 
1987  20.0  62.6 
<I0  3.9  49.3 
10-20  10.3  19.8 
20-30  16.7  54.9 
30-40  24.1  61.8 
40-50  31.9  64.6 
50-75  35.8  68.0 
>75  33.2  83.9 
25-34  18.3  53.3 
35-44  22.2  63.3 
45-54  21.3  66.9 
S5-64  17.6  72.0 
1987 Income categories (thousand $) 
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Source  Authors’ tabulations from the SIPP, as described in the text 
and who were thus eligible to contribute increased from 13.3 to 20.0 percent. 
Perhaps the most striking feature of these plans is the high participation rate 
of  those who are eligible, 58.1 percent in 1984 and 62.6 percent in 1987.’ 
The 401(k) participation rate of  eligible families is more than twice as high 
as the participation rate in the IRA program, for which virtually all wage earn- 
ers were eligible through the 1986  tax year.*  For example, 25.4 percent of fami- 
lies had IRA accounts in  1984, and 28.8 percent had these accounts in  1987. 
In fact, the difference in participation rates is greater than these data suggest; 
the “rates” are not precisely comparable. A family is counted as “participating” 
in a 401(k) if it contributed  to a plan in the year of the survey. But a family 
need only have an IRA account to be classified as participating  in the IRA 
program. Thus the IRA rate overestimates the proportion of  families currently 
contributing to an IRA. This difference is especially important after the  1986 
restrictions on IRA eligibility. 
Several factors may account for the higher 401(k) participation rate, includ- 
1. Throughout this paper we view 401(k) participation as a voluntary employee choice. Some 
employers make contributions to their employees’ 40 I(k) accounts even if the employees choose 
not to make contributions. Only 24 percent of all 401(k) plans, and 5 percent of the plans at large 
employers, have this feature (see U.S. General .4ccounting Office [GAO] 1988a). 
2. The 1987 data are for the months January-April.  IRA contributions made during this period 
are generally for the  1986 tax year. Thus 1987 IRA data from the SIPP typically reflect the tax 
rules in effect through 1986. 109  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
ing attractive employer matching, some degree of encouragement for worker 
participation from employers, or the presence in some plans of “hardship with- 
drawal” provisions that make 401(k)s somewhat  more  liquid than IRAs.  In 
addition, 401  (k) contributions  are usually made through payroll  deductions, 
which may  serve as a form of  self-control  and ensure that a saving plan is 
adhered to. Once the payroll deduction form has been signed, saving is further 
removed  from day-to-day  competition  with  consumption; salary  reductions 
never appear as spendable earnings. 
The two lower panels of table 4.1 report the income and age characteristics 
of families eligible for and participating in 401(k)s in 1987. The third column 
of the middle panel reveals that 401(k) participation  is closely related to in- 
come. Among families with incomes less than $10,000, about 2 percent partic- 
ipate in a 401(k). For higher income families, the participation rate exceeds 
25 percent. 
The relationship between income and 401  (k) participation that is graphed in 
figure 4.1 reflects both the relationship between income and 401(k) eligibility 
and the correlation between income and contributions conditional on eligibil- 
ity.  While  only  about  4  percent  of  families with  annual  income  less  than 
$10,000 work for employers who offer 401  (k) plans, almost 35 percent of those 
with incomes above $50,000 are eligible for such plans3  The 401(k) participa- 
tion rate conditional  on eligibility also rises as income rises, from about 50 
Income Interval 
Fig. 4.1 
eligibility, 1987 (by income) 
401(k) rates of participation, eligibility, and participation given 
3. Eligibility shows only a weak relationship to  age, however. Given eligibility, more than 50 
percent of families in almost every age-income group participate in 401(k)  plans. 110  James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise 
percent for families with income less than $10,000 to 84 percent for families 
with income over $75,000. 
The increase in participation as income rises is much less pronounced than 
the corresponding pattern for IRAs. IRA participation  is only about 8 percent 
for families with income less than $10,000 but increases to 67 percent for those 
with income above $75,000. 
4.1.2  401(k) Balances 
Table 4.2 shows that  in  1987, the  mean  balance  in 401(k)  accounts  was 
$1,237 for all households. The mean IRA balance was $2,836. Among those 
who had 401(k) accounts, the mean 401(k) balance was $9,862 in 1987, almost 
the same as the mean IRA balance of families who had IRAs, $9,841. Among 
Table 4.2  Mean and Median Balances in 401(k) and IRA Accounts, 1987 
Participants"  Ail Households 
Income (thousand $)  Median  Mean  Median  Mean 
All 























401(k)  Balances 
4,000  9,862 
1,000  1,628 
1,000  4,328 
2,000  4.5 10 
4,000  7,856 
4,000  9,02  1 
6.300  13,584 
11,560  20.350 
8,000  9,841 
6,000  7,538 
4,500  6,955 
5,024  7,247 
7,000  9,O 16 
7,550  9,112 
10,000  11,690 
13,600  15,175 
18,000  24,208 
12,500  10,530 
7,045  1 1,453 
11,000  14,777 
14,856  17,666 
13,000  19,535 
22,000  26,893 
31,518  37,295 
IRA  Balances 









































Source: Authors' tabulations from the SIPP. 
dParticipation  in a 401(k) or IRA defined as a balance greater than zero in that plan. Participation 
in IRA + 401(k) defined as balances greater than zero in both plans. 111  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
participants, however, the median 401(k) balance is half the median IRA bal- 
ance. There are fewer very  large IRA account balances than there  are very 
large 401(k) balances because of the lower legal contribution limit for IRAs. 
Table 4.2 also reports the distribution of 401(k) and IRA balances by income. 
For low income groups, the mean 401(k) balance was about 20 percent of the 
IRA mean, and for high income groups, about half of the IRA mean. Condi- 
tional on participating in a 401(k), however, the mean 401(k) balance for high 
income households actually exceeds that in IRAs. 
That the relationship of 401(k) assets to income is stronger than that of IRA 
assets, given participation, is probably the result of two effects. First, contribu- 
tions  to 401(k) plans, unlike IRA  contributions, are typically  specified  as a 
percentage of  salary. This applies to both employer  and employee contribu- 
tions.  Thus high-income employees  tend  to contribute more than  their low- 
income counterparts. Second, the contribution limits to the two plans are dif- 
ferent. The IRA limit is typically $2,000. The 401(k) limit was $45,475 before 
1982, $30,000 before the  1986 Tax Reform Act, and $7,000 thereafter. Thus 
there is much more latitude for 401(k) contributions to increase with income. 
A large fraction of the financial assets of most families was in the form of 
IRAs  or 401(k)s.  Table 4.3 reports median  financial  total  and other assets, 
401(k) account balances, and IRA balances, for families in 1987 classified by 
401(k) and IRA participation. Even families that had only 401(k)s had a large 
fraction of  their assets in this form-$2,800  versus $2,149 in other financial 
assets. Families with both 401(k)s and IRAs typically  had more in these ac- 
counts than in other financial assets-$18,000  versus $14,350. Families with 
both  401(k)s and IRAs had  much larger balances in both accounts together 
than  families with only  IRAs had. The large share of assets held  in 401(k) 
accounts will in all likelihood rise over time, as households continue to contrib- 
ute to these accounts. It is particularly  striking in light of  the relatively  short 
time that these plans have been available. 
4.2  Characteristics of 401(k) Plans: Preliminary Evidence 
This section presents descriptive evidence on characteristics of 401(k) plans 
that may  affect the degree to which they are viewed as substitutes for other 
tax-deferred  saving vehicles.  These plan  characteristics  should also feature 
prominently in future work on 401 (k) participation decisions. 
4.2.1  Employer Matching Rates 
A  1988 US. General  Accounting  Office  (US. GAO  1988b) survey  of 
401(k) plans suggested that participation  rates are much higher in plans with 
some employer matching of worker contributions. Table 4.4 presents summary 
tabulations from the  GAO survey. While the employee participation  rate in 
plans  without  any matching was less than 50 percent, the rate exceeded  75 
percent in plans with employer matching. The increase in participation rates 112  James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise 
Table 4.3  Median and Mean Asset Balances by 401(k)  and IRA Participation, 1987 
Asset 
Households  Households  IRA-Only  401(k)-Only  Households  All 
with IRA  with 401(k1  Households  Households  with Both  Households 
Total financial assets 




Non-IRA-401  (k) 
assets 
assets excluding 
stocks and bonds 
IRA 
401(k) 
IRA and 401(k) 
Debt 
Total financial assets 







stocks and bonds 
IRA 
401(k) 




































































































Source: Authors'  tabulations based on the SIPP. 
Table 4.4  401(k)  Participation Rates by Employer Match Rate, 1986 
Match Rate ('3%)  Participation Rate (9%)  Average ContributiodSalary (7o) 
0  49.5  3.5 
0-25  75.3  3.8 
25-50  75.6  3.8 
50-75  81.0  3.8 
75-100  64.5  4.2 
100  98.6  7.0 
>  100  88.1  8.6 
Source; U.S. GAO (1988b) 113  40 1  (k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
as the firm match rate rises is less clear, but the nearly 90 percent participation 
rate for plans with more than dollar-for-dollar matching suggests there may be 
some incremental effects. 
The data in table 4.4 also suggest that employees tend to contribute a higher 
fraction of their salary when employer match rates are more generous. Condi- 
tional on participating, employees at firms with no matching provisions con- 
tribute 3.5 percent of their salary. Those with plans matching more than dollar- 
for-dollar, however, contribute an average of  8.6 percent of salary. 
We also investigated the importance of matching using the 1989 SCF, which 
includes information on both the employer match rate and the amount of  em- 
ployee contribution. Table 4.5 shows that nearly 40 percent of 401(k) partici- 
pants in the SCF face match rates less than  10 percent, while one-quarter are 
matched more than dollar-for-dollar by their employers. For these employees, 
401(k)s are clearly superior to IRAs, even when the IRA contribution is tax- 
deductible. The US. GAO (1988a) tabulations show that 51 percent of  the 
firms sponsoring 401 (k) plans matched employee contributions. As in the SCF, 
the GAO found that the majority of plans with matching provisions involved 
dollar-for-dollar matching. The similarity between the GAO and SCF results 
is encouraging, because the underlying sampling rules are different. The GAO 
results  weight  each plan equally, while  our SCF tabulations average across 
households and therefore weight plans in proportion  to their number of con- 
tributors. 
Table 4.6 displays the distribution of employee contribution rates, as a share 
of  salary, for those who reported 401(k) participation  in the  1988 CPS. Most 
employees contribute  3-9  percent  of  their  salary  to the 401(k)  plan. These 
results are similar to those from the 1989 SCF, although many more SCF parti- 
cipants (10.3 percent) indicated zero employee contributions to the plan. 
4.2.2  Other Plan Provisions 
Employer matching rates are probably the most important dimension along 
which 401(k) plans differ, but there are many other features of these plans that 
Table 4.5  Employer Match Rate for 401(k) Plan Contributions, 1989 
Percentage of All 401  (k) 
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Table 4.6  Share of Employee Salary Contributed to 401(k) Plan, 1988 
Percentage of All 401(k) 
Participants (9%) 
Share of 
Salary (%)  Percentage  Cumulative 
0  1 .o  I .6 
1  4.2  5.8 
2  7.5  13.3 
3  9.0  22.3 
4  7.7  30.0 
5  19.6  49.6 
6  16.1  65.7 
7  4.6  70.3 
8  5.8  76.1 
9  1.6  77.7 
10  11.8  89.5 
>I0  9.4  100.0 
Source: Authors’ tabulations from the 1988 CPS 
can affect their attractiveness as saving vehicles. Table 4.7 presents descriptive 
information on the plans surveyed by  the GAO in  1987. The table describes 
four plan provisions and yields no strong evidence on the link between these 
provisions and participation rates. 
Participation rates are slightly higher in plans that preclude employees from 
borrowing against their accumulated  balances, making their own investment 
choices, or making hardship withdrawals of their own contributions. While the 
differential participation rates are relatively small in all three cases, the pattern 
is surprising, since employees appear more likely to participate in plans that 
reduce their financial flexibility. These data are an invitation to further work, 
since the bivariate tabulations do not control for match rates or characteristics 
of the firm  or workers covered by these plans. 
4.3  Are 401(k)s and IRAs Substitutes? 
A central issue in evaluating the net saving effects of tax-advantaged saving 
plans is the extent to which these plans serve as substitutes for other forms of 
saving. The net  saving effect of 401(k) plans depends both on the extent to 
which individuals treat them as substitutes for traditional saving vehicles, and 
on the extent to which 401(k) plans substitute for other tax-advantaged saving 
plans such as IRAs. 
Focusing on household behavior with respect to only one saving incentive 
program may yield misleading inferences about the consequences of changing 
the provisions of that program. For example, an increase in the IRA contribu- 
tion limit is typically viewed as affecting the opportunity set of an individual 115  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
Table 4.7  401(k) Participation Rates by Various Plan Characteristics, 1986 












Hardship withdrawals for 


















Source: U.S. GAO (1988b). 
who is making the maximum possible IRA contribution. However, this may be 
incorrect if  the IRA contributor is also participating in a 401(k) plan but not 
contributing up to the 401(k) limit, since this person’s total tax-deferred saving 
is not constrained.  If 401(k) and IRA accounts are treated as perfect  substi- 
tutes,  then  changing  the  IRA limit  should  not  affect  the  saving  of  such a 
household. 
In  contrast, a  high-income  worker  who  is  not  eligible  to  make  a  tax- 
deductible IRA contribution  might change her saving if  an employer 401(k) 
plan became available  to her. If  she contributed  the 401(k) maximum, then 
changes in this limit would directly affect her saving. A “rational” saver should 
never contribute  less than the maximum  to a 401(k) and also make a non- 
deductible IRA contribution,  since raising the former and reducing the latter 
would reduce her current tax liability with no change in net worth. 
A few high-income  households  make limit contributions  to both a 401(k) 
plan and an IRA.4 If  these households  do no further saving through taxable 
channels, then changes in the IRA contribution limit or the 401(k) limit will 
almost surely affect their total saving. If these households save through taxable 
channels, then all tax-deferred saving might be thought of  as inframarginal. If 
individuals treat all forms of saving as perfect substitutes, then changing either 
contribution limit would not affect net saving. A central issue in evaluating the 
net  saving effects of IRAs is the degree to which IRAs and other forms of 
4. Two-thirds to three-quarters of all IRA contributions are at the contribution limit. Only about 
3 percent of all 401(k) contributions are at the post-1986 legal contribution limit. However, about 
40 percent of firm 401(k) plans place additional limits on the contributions of some highly paid 
employees to  comply with “nondiscrimination” tests for pension plans. See U.S. GAO (1988a) 
and Hewitt Associates (1988), 116  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
saving are treated as substitutes.s To illuminate the pattern of substitution be- 
tween IRA and 401 (k) saving and the correspondence between actual saving 
patterns and “rational” patterns, this section presents  data on the interaction 
between IRA and 401(k) saving. 
4.3.1 
Table 4.8 presents evidence on the overlap between IRA and 401(k) saving. 
The data show the percentage of persons who make 401(k) contributions who 
also participate in IRAs. The SIPP, the source for these tabulations, indicates 
whether a family has an IRA account in each year but does not report whether 
a contribution was made in that year. Even in the early years of the IRA pro- 
gram, the percentage of families contributing in a given year was less than the 
percentage with an account. In later years, particularly following the Tax Re- 
form Act  of  1986, the two percentages  diverged as families that  were once 
regular  participants  stopped  contributing.  In  1987, for instance,  more  than 
twice as many families had accounts as contributed. 
To provide information on IRA contributions as well as accounts, therefore, 
we present data from the CPS, which reports the percentage of persons making 
an IRA contribution in the  1982 and  1987 tax years. Because the 1987 CPS 
data pertain to the 1987 tax year, they reflect the eligibility restrictions imposed 
by  the Tax Reform Act of  1986. In  1987, 47 percent of 401(k) contributors 
also had IRA accounts. The CPS data for 1987 reveal that only 17 percent of 
401(k) contributors also made an IRA contribution, a substantial decline from 
37 percent in 1982. 
4.3.2 
The Overlap between 401(k) and IRA Saving 
401(k)s and the Post-1986 Fall in IRA Contributions 
It  is tempting to conclude that, as 401(k)s became more widely available, 
they displaced IRAs because employer matching made them more attractive. 
A large fraction of 401(k) contributors became ineligible for the full tax advan- 
tages of the IRA after 1986, however, and this may have induced a decline in 
IRA contributions even without any 401(k) substitution. This view is supported 
by  the similarity between the decline in IRA participation among households 
Table 4.8  Overlap of 401(k)s and IRAs, 1982-87 
1982 CPS  1984 SIPP  1987 SIPP  I987 CPS 
Percentage of 401  (k) 
contnbutor5 who 
Hate dn  IRA  -  41  I  47 1  - 
Contribute to an IRA  37 0  17 4  -  - 
Source: Authors’ tabulations using surveys as indicated. 
5.  This is the focus of empirical work by Feenberg and Skinner (1989), Gale and Scholz (1994), 
and Venti and Wise (1986, 1990a, 1990b, 1992). 117  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
that are eligible, and those that are ineligible, for 401(k)s. The proportion of 
all tax filers making IRA contributions rose from 12.6 to 15.9 percent between 
1982 and 1986, and then fell to 6.8 percent in 1987. The decline in IRA partici- 
pation  for 401(k) participants  thus  mirrors  the  population  reduction,  sug- 
gesting that tax reform and not the diffusion of 401(k)s explains the IRA de- 
cline. 
The sharp decline in IRA contributions after  1986 was common to all in- 
come groups. Table 4.9 shows the percentage  of persons who contributed to 
an IRA, by 401(k) eligibility status and by income interval, in 1982 and 1987. 
The data suggest several important conclusions that are made clear with the 
aid of figure 4.2. First, controlling for income, the percentage  of 401(k) eli- 
gibles who contributed to an IRA in 1982 was very close to the percentage of 
ineligibles who contributed. The contribution rates are significantly different 
only for the less than $10,000  and greater than $75,000 income groups, for 
which the percentage of 401(k) eligibles contributing to IRAs is higher than 
the percentage of ineligibles.6 If IRAs and 401(k)s were viewed as close substi- 
tutes, then IRA accounts would be less prevalent among those eligible for a 
401  (k). These data consequently cast doubt on either  standard assumptions 
about saving behavior or the assumption that IRAs and 401(k)s are perfect sub- 
stitutes. 
Second, the decline in IRA contributions after 1986 is not consistent with a 
high degree of substitution between IRAs and 401 (k)s. The Tax Reform Act 
of  1986 phased out the tax deduction for IRA contributions for higher-income 
taxpayers-married  filing units with incomes above $40,000 and single filers 
with  incomes  above  $30,000-provided  they  were  also  covered  by  an 
employer-sponsored pension plan. Approximately  73 percent of all tax filers 
Table 4.9  Percentage Contributing to an IRA by 401(k) Eligibility and Income 
1982  1987 
Income  Not Eligible 

















Eligible  Not Eligible  Eligible 
for 401(k)  for 401(k)  for 401(k) 
20.9  7.2  12.8 
18.5  9.6  12.2 
22.9  15.8  14.0 
39.2  18.3  17.5 
46.3  24.2  15.3 
55.2  26.5  19.6 
85.4  37.2  28.7 
26.0  12.9  15.3 
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on  1983 and  1988 CPS. 
6. App. A presents estimates of  standard errors for the levels and differences in participation 
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Fig. 4.2  IRA contribution percentage by 401(k) eligibility, 1982 and 1987 
were  unaffected  by  the changes. Given  these  changes,  one would  have ex- 
pected little change in IRA contribution behavior at low income levels and the 
greatest  response  among  high-income  households  that  were  eligible  for a 
401(k) plan.’ In fact, the percentage contributing to IRAs fell dramatically for 
all income groups after 1986, and it was largely independent of 401(k) eligibil- 
ity. Only for the greater than $75,000  income group was thefull in the contribu- 
tion rate for 401(k) eligibles significantly greater than the fall in the contribu- 
tion rate for the 401(k) ineligibles. Thus the availability of the 401(k) option 
cannot explain the drop in IRA contributions. 
Figure 4.3 presents IRA contribution  rates for 1985 and  1988, by  income 
interval, without accounting for 401(k) eligibility. The data used to construct 
these  figures are from the IRS  Statistics of  Income series. Actual  rates  are 
shown in figure 4.3A, and the percentage  decline between  1985 and 1988 is 
presented in figure 4.3B. Families that lost the up-front tax deduction virtually 
quit contributing  after the  1986 legislation.  Close to 70 percent of  families 
with incomes greater that $50,000 made IRA contributions before  1986. But 
after the legislation, the proportion fell by  almost 90 percent, to less than  10 
percent.  Families with incomes between  $40,000 and $50,000-the  interval 
over which the up-front deduction was phased out-reduced  their contribution 
7. An alternative view is that the Tax Reform Act of  1986 lowered marginal  tax rates and thus 
made the IRA tax deduction less attractive. But IRA contributions fell even for low-income fami- 
lies that experienced little change in marginal tax rates because of the 1986 legislation (see Haus- 
man and Poterba 1987). 119  401(k)  Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
A 
Income interval 
Fig. 4.3  A, IRA contribution rate by income interval, 1985 and 1988. B, Decline 
in IRA contribution rate by income interval, 1985-88. 
rate by 70 percent. Even lower-income families unaffected by the legislation 
reduced their contributions by between 40 and 50 percent. 
The across-the-board reduction in the IRA contribution rate was undoubt- 
edly due in part to a misperception of the  1986 legislation, especially among 
lower-income families. Higher-income families may also have misunderstood 
the legislation, thinking that both the up-front deduction and the tax-free accu- 
mulation of returns had been eliminated. The systematic decline in IRA contri- 120  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
butions also suggests that the promotion of these accounts may have been an 
important determinant of their widespread use. 
Third, the pattern of IRA contribution rates in 1987 suggests only a modest 
relationship  between  IRA contributions  and 401(k) eligibility. The rates  for 
401(k) eligibles are significantly lower than the rates for ineligibles in income 
categories above $40,000. At lower income levels, however, there is little rela- 
tionship between IRA participation  and the availability  of  a 401(k) plan. In- 
deed, the rate for eligibles is significantly higher than the rate for ineligibles 
in the two lowest income intervals. This suggests that, for households that re- 
mained eligible for tax-deductible IRAs after the 1986 tax reform, 401(k) sav- 
ing did not displace IRA saving. Taken together, the results suggest that IRA 
contributions were curtailed as a result of the  1986 tax reform but were  not 
displaced by 401(k)s. 
4.3.3  IRA and 401(k) Saving by 401(k) Eligibles 
Table 4.10 provides information on the saving behavior of all families eligi- 
ble for 401(k)s in  1987. The first column, based  on  SIPP data,  pertains  to 
families and indicates whether the family has an IRA account  in  1987. The 
second  column, based  on  CPS data, pertains  to  individuals  and  indicates 
whether the individual contributed to an IRA in 1987. Only about one-third of 
401(k) eligibles saved in neither a 401(k) nor an IRA. Among those eligible 
for a 401(k), 40 percent have an IRA account and  10.4 percent have only an 
IRA; 15.5 percent contribute to an IRA and 5.1 percent contribute only to an 
IRA. The IRA contribution rate for those eligible to make 401 (k) contributions 
exceeded the IRA contribution rate for all tax filers in 1987, but this is because 
of the higher income of 401(k) eligibles. Controlling for income, there is little 
difference between the two groups except at higher income intervals, as shown 
in table 4.9. 
4.3.4  IRA Limit Contributors and 401(k) Saving 
The overlap between 401 (k) and IRA saving for families making maximum 
possible IRA contributions  in  1984 is shown in table 4.1 1.  It  might  be pre- 
Table 4.10  Retirement Plan Use by Families Eligible for 401(k)s (%) 
1987 SIPP  1987 CPS 
Neither a 401(k) nor an IRA  27. I  35.5 
Only an IRA  10.4  5.1 
Only a 401(k)  33.1  49.0 
Both a 401(k) and an IRA  29.5  10.4 
Source: Authors’ tabulations from the CPS and the SIPP. 
Note: The 1987 SIPP data pertain to families and to IRA account7. The 1987 CPS data pertain to 
individuals and to IRA contributions. 121  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
Table 4.11  IRA Limit Status versus 401(k) Participation 
IRA  IRA Limit  All 
Participants  Contributors  Households 
Probability of 401(k) participation  (’3%)  16.2  17.2  11.5 
Probability of  401(k) participation if 
eligible (lo)  65.8  66.1  56.0 
401(k)  40 1  (k)  All 
Eligibles  Participants  Households 
Probability of  IRA limit contribution (%)  20.6  24.3  16.3 
Probability of IRA contribution (%)  26.2  30.8  21.9 
Source: Authors’ tabulations based on merging waves 4 and 7 of the 1984 SIPP Panel. A house- 
hold is defined to be an IRA contributor in a year if the change in the IRA balance over the one- 
year interval exceeded 9500. A household is defined to be a limit contributor if the change in the 
balance exceeded $2,000. 
sumed that persons at the IRA limit are constrained by the limit and thus would 
like more tax-deferred saving. Indeed, 66 percent of families at the IRA maxi- 
mum make additional  contributions  to a 401(k) plan if they are eligible for 
such a plan. The significant fraction that does not take advantage of  the 401(k) 
is striking, because  employer matching  typically makes a 401(k) plan more 
attractive than an IRA. Perhaps some families are only motivated to make an 
IRA contribution to shelter income at the time of tax filing and do not consider 
the role of IRAs in an ongoing saving plan. This is consistent with the finding 
that one-third to one-half of all IRA contributions are made between the end 
of the tax year and the April 15 filing deadline (Summers 1986; Skinner 1992). 
Among families who were eligible to participate in a 401(k), 26.2 percent 
made an IRA contribution. Of those who made a 401(k) contribution, 31 per- 
cent also contributed to an IRA. Although the data do not indicate whether the 
401(k) contributors who made IRA contributions were at the 401(k) limit, it is 
likely that most were not. This pattern is also surprising, since for many house- 
holds 401  (k)s probably yield higher returns, inclusive of employer matching, 
than IRAs. 
The results in this section cast doubt on the assumption  that  all forms of 
saving, and particularly saving in 401(k)s and IRAs, are treated as perfect sub- 
stitutes. They also raise doubts about the extent to which all households  are 
“rational” savers, basing saving decisions on economic return criteria only. The 
relationship between 401(k) eligibility and IRA saving is weak, and a substan- 
tial proportion  of families save in IRAs even though they could make addi- 
tional 40  1  (k) contributions. Understanding why some households save through 
dominated saving instruments is an important issue for future work. 122  James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise 
4.4  The Saving Effects of 401(k) Plans 
To  investigate whether  401  (k) contributions  represent  “new  saving,” one 
could compare the total non-40l(k) saving of 401(k) contributors to the total 
non-401 (k) saving of noncontributors.  Contributors  save more in non-40 1  (k) 
forms than  do noncontributors,  even  after controlling  for differences  in in- 
come, and thus the total saving of  401(k) contributors exceeds the total saving 
of noncontributors. This does not necessarily mean that 401(k)s increased total 
saving, because  the  comparison  of  contributors  to noncontributors  ignores 
individual-specific saving effects. Some families are “savers” and some fami- 
lies are “nonsavers,” and the former are likely to save more  in all available 
forms. Convincing evidence on the net saving effect of 401(k)s therefore re- 
quires a more subtle test. 
We use two simple approaches to consider the saving effect of 401(k)s, both 
intended to control for individual-specific  saving effects. The first considers 
two demographically similar random cross sections of “like families” that have 
been “exposed” to 401(k) plans and IRAs for different periods of time. Since 
age, income, and other characteristics of the two cross sections are similar, one 
would expect saving balances also to be similar. However, the 1984 sample has 
had only about two years (1982-84)  to accumulate 401(k) and IRA balances, 
but the more recent sample has had about five years. The central question is 
whether longer “exposure” to these plans results in higher levels of  saving.x 
Our second approach relies on the natural experiment that is provided by the 
largely exogenous determination of 401  (k) eligibility. It considers whether eli- 
gibility is associated with higher levels of total saving, holding income con- 
stant. This approach views 401(k) eligibility as the “treatment”  in a “natural 
experiment” to evaluate the effect of tax incentives on saving. 
4.4.1  Changes in Assets of “Like Families”:  1984 versus  1987 
In this subsection we compare two independent samples of households that 
contribute to 401(k)s. The samples are randomly chosen and thus are similar 
with respect to age, income, and other economic and demographic characteris- 
tics. One sample is from 1984, and the other is from 1987. In principle, we are 
comparing a typical person aged, say, 40 in 1984 to another person aged 40 in 
1987. Both persons are at the same point in the life cycle and would presum- 
ably have accumulated similar levels of assets, abstracting from possible aggre- 
gate effects due to asset appreciation rates between  1984 and 1987. 
8. An issue that cannot be controlled for with this approach is the possibility that the persons 
who took up the 401(k) option were those who were about to change their saving behavior, that 
the 401(k)  just happened to be available at the opportune time, and that it was used as the saving 
vehicle for the reborn saver who would have increased saving in another form, had it not been for 
the 401(k) option. The second approach (below) tends to minimize the potential confounding of 
effect of this possible coincidence. This issue is discussed in more detail, with respect to IRAs, in 
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There is one important difference, however. The 401(k) contributor in 1984 
had roughly two years over which  contributions could be made; the 401(k) 
contributor in  1987 had roughly five years. If  401(k) contributions represent 
asset transfers, then the total asset balances of the 1984 and 1987 contributors 
should be  roughly  the  same-additional  401(k)  contributions  made  by  the 
1987 contributor  would replace  saving that would  have been done in  other 
forms. If  401(k) contributions represent new saving, however, then the total 
financial  assets-including  40l(k)s-of  the  1987 contributor should exceed 
the total assets of the  1984 contributor by the amount contributed to 401(k)s 
between  1984 and 1987. 
The assets of families that had only 401(k) plans are shown in the first panel 
of table 4.12. The financial assets of these families in 1987 data are shown in 
the second and fourth columns. The median of total financial assets was about 
$6,100 excluding, and $7,300 including, stocks and bonds. We would like to 
know how much financial wealth families like these had in 1984. Was it about 
Table 4.12  Median IRA and 401(k) versus Other Financial Asset Balances by 
‘Qpe of Asset Held, 1984 and 1987 
Group 
Excluding Stocks  Including Stocks 
and Bonds  and Bonds 
1984  1987  1984  1987 
Families with 401(k) only 
Total assets 





Other than IRA 
IRA 
Debt 
Families without IRA 
Total assets 
Families with IRA and 401(k) 
Total assets 
Other than IRA or 401(k) 
IRA 
40l(k) 
IRA and 40  1  (k) 
Debt 
Total assets 
Families without 401(k) 
Families with IRA only 
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the same as in  1987, suggesting no net saving effect, or did it increase, sug- 
gesting a net addition to saving? We assume that the families that participated 
in 401(k) plans in  1987 are like those that participated  in such plans in 1984, 
except that the 1987 families were able to make plan contributions for two or 
three more years. The data for  1984 are not complete, however, because the 
SIPP did not obtain 401(k) asset balances in that year. Thus both 401(k) and 
total financial asset balances are missing. 
It is nonetheless possible to make rough judgements about the net saving 
effect of  the 401(k)  contributions.  No change in  non-40l(k) asset balances 
would  suggest no substitution of  401(k) for other forms of  saving, and thus 
that 401(k) balances represented net new saving, no matter what the magnitude 
of  the 401(k) saving. The data, however, show a small decline in the median 
of other-non-401  (k)-assets  between  1984 and 1987, about $850 including 
stocks and bonds  and about $300 excluding stocks and bonds. Median debt 
increased by about $200. Thus, we would like to compare this decline with the 
increase in 401(k) assets. 
The increase in the median 401(k) balance was undoubtedly substantial, but 
we  can provide only a rough  approximation of  the  amount of  the  increase. 
About 40 percent of the families that had plans in  1987 did not have them in 
1984. The typical  401 (k) contribution  is well  above $2,000  (actually  about 
$2,500). Thus, as a rough approximation, assume that the 401(k) balances of 
employees  who had accounts in  1984 increased about $5,000 between  1984 
and 1987. Again as a rough approximation, assume that the increase for those 
who began to contribute after 1984 was about $2,500 on average. The average 
increase would then be about $4,000 (0.4 X $2,500 + 0.6 X $5,000). If these 
401(k) contributions replaced saving that would  otherwise have occurred  in 
other forms, the non-40l(k) assets of  the contributors should have fallen by 
about  the  same amount as the  increase in 401(k) assets. But the  decline in 
other assets was much smaller than the probable increase in 401(k) assets. This 
suggests that, in large part, the 401(k) contributions represented net new sav- 
it~g.~  In  contrast to the substantial  increase in the financial assets of families 
with 401(k)s, families without 401(k)s had about the same median  wealth in 
both years-exactly  the same excluding stocks and bonds, and $1,949 in  1984 
versus $2,000 in 1987 if stocks and bonds are included. 
A similar comparison can be made between families that had only IRA ac- 
counts in  1987 and families that had only IRA accounts in 1984. These data 
are shown in the second panel of table 4.12. This comparison is more complete 
and probably more accurate than the comparison for 401 (k) participants. how- 
ever, because total assets are known in both years and because the sample size 
is much larger than the sample of families with 401(k)s only. Consider families 
9. The approximations  used in this paragraph relate more directly to means than to medians. 
Table 4.12 is reproduced  in App. table 4B.1, but means rather than  medians are reported. The 
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that had IRA accounts in  1987. Again, we assume that the families that had 
IRA accounts in  1987 are like those that had such accounts in  1984, except 
that the  1987 families were able to make IRA contributions for two or three 
more years. Indeed, the  1987 families had $2,859 more in IRA accounts than 
the  1984 families. If  additional IRA contributions replaced saving that would 
otherwise  have  occurred  in  other  forms,  however, total  assets  of  the  1987 
sample should have been about the same as the total for the 1984 sample. But 
the median total financial assets of the 1987 families were in fact $3,130 larger 
than the total financial assets of  the  1984 families. There was essentially no 
change in the nominal value of other financial asset balances ($9,400 in  1984 
vs. $9,483 in  1987). In addition, there was no change in median  debt. This 
suggests that  the IRA contributions did not replace other saving. The basic 
pattern  is the same whether stocks and bonds are included or excluded from 
the measure of other financial assets. These results are similar to those in ear- 
lier studies of IRA contributors (see, e.g., Venti and Wise 1990a, 1990b, 1992) 
and are directly comparable to the results in Venti and Wise (1992), based on 
Consumer Expenditure Survey data. 
Comparable data for families that had both IRA and 401 (k) accounts in 1987 
and families that had both accounts in 1984 are shown in the bottom panel of 
table 4.12. By  1987, families  with  both  accounts had  a median  balance of 
$18,000 in the two together, approximately half the median balance in total 
financial assets. Like the data for the 401 (k)-only group, the data for this group 
are incomplete, because 401(k) balances were not obtained in the 1984 survey, 
but the basic  inference is the  same. IRA and 401(k) contributions were not 
offset by  reduced saving in other financial asset forms. If  they had been, the 
1987 families would have accumulated fewer assets in other forms, because 
when they started to contribute to IRAs and 401(k)s they would have  saved 
less in other forms. 
The data show that the  1987 respondents had somewhat larger balances in 
non-40l(k)-IRA financial assets than the 1984 respondents had, and their me- 
dian debt was only slightly larger ($700 in 1987 vs. $500 in 1984). These data 
also suggest little substitution between IRA and 401(k) saving. The IRA bal- 
ance for this group increased by $4,000-$1,000  more than the increase in the 
IRA balance for those with IRAs only. 
4.4.2  Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility 
This section relies on the natural experiment that is provided by  the essen- 
tially  exogenous determination  of  401 (k) eligibility to explore the effect of 
401(k) contributions on total saving. Eligibility is determined by employers. If 
household saving behavior is independent of individual characteristics related 
to the probability of working at firms with 401(k) plans, an assumption which 
is unlikely  to be completely  accurate, then  comparison  of  the net  worth of 
families with  and  without  401(k) eligibility can be used  to infer the  saving 
effect of these plans. If there are no net saving effects of 401(k)s, then families 126  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
who have the 401(k) option should have similar net worth, but less non-40l(k) 
assets, than those families without 401 (k) eligibility. 
Median financial asset balances by 401(k) eligibility and by income interval 
are shown in  table 4.13 for  1987 and  1984. We  stratify by  income because 
401(k) eligibility increases with income. If, given income, eligibility is deter- 
mined exogenously, then the data allow strong inferences about the saving ef- 
fect of 401(k) plans. Figure 4.4 presents information from this table in graphi- 
cal form. Figure 4.4A  shows that  families whose employers offered 401(k) 
plans had substantially greater total financial assets in  1987 than did families 
whose employers did not provide such plans. For example, the median level of 
financial assets of  families with incomes between $50,000 and $75,000 who 
were eligible for a 401(k) was $25,343, whereas the median for families who 
were  not  eligible  was only  $14,650.  If  when  families  became  eligible  for 
401(k) plans they reduced saving in other forms, the typical family eligible for 
a 401(k) in 1987 should have less accumulated wealth in other financial assets 
than the typical family who had not been eligible for a 401(k). Figure 4.4B 
shows that this was not the case. There was little difference in the other finan- 
cial assets between  families who were and those who  were  not eligible for 
a 401(k).  Indeed, the eligible families had  somewhat higher  levels of  other 
financial assets. 
Table 4.13  Median Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility and Income, 1984 and 1987 
Income (thousand $) 
Group  110  10-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-75  >75  All 
Not eligible for a 401(k) 
All financial assets  22 
Other assets  20 
IRA  0 
All financial assets  1,090 
Other assets  36 I 
IRA  0 
401(k)  0 
Eligible for a 401(k) 
1987 
400  1,366  4,000  6,630  14.650  30,900  1,870 
350  1,052  2,800  4,245  8,737  21,200  1,300 
0  0  0  0  2,000  6,000  0 
1,190  4,000  9,205  12,650  25,343  58,119  10,330 
305  1,250  3,250  5,800  11,200  25,500  4,000 
0  0  0  0  2,500  11,204  0 
0  150  1,000  1,000  1,500  8,500  1,000 
I984 
Not eligible for a 401(k) 
All financial assets  34  458  1,768  3,950  7,150  15,870  19,000  1,850 
Other assets  30  400  1,400  3,000  5,138  11,000  21,950  1,400 
IRA  0  0  0  0  0  2,000  4,000  0 
All financial assetsd  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Other assets  25  509  1,749  3,740  5,049  11,500  30,400  3,740 
IRA  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
401(k)"  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Eligible for a 401(k) 
-  - 
- 
"01(k)  assets are not available for 1984. Entries are in nominal  1984 and 1987 dollars. 127  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
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Fig. 4.4  Assets by 401(k) eligibility.  A, Total financial assets of all families, 
1987. B, Other financial assets of all families, 1987. C,  Other financial assets of 
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Fig. 4.4  (continued) 
The data also show that, in 1984, eligible and ineligible families had virtu- 
ally the same levels of other financial assets. Figure 4.4C suggests that 401(k) 
contributions did  not  substitute for other financial asset  saving."' Moreover, 
other financial assets of eligible families in 1984 were about the same as the 
other financial assets of  eligible families in  1987, as shown  in  figure 4.40, 
again suggesting that 401 (k) assets did not substitute for other financial assets. 
Table 4.14 also distinguishes families on the basis of 401(k) eligibility, but 
the data pertain to families-eligible  or ineligible for a 40l(k)-that  had IRA 
accounts. The conclusions are the same as those suggested by  table 4.13 and 
figure 4.4. Eligible families have greater total  financial wealth, but  other fi- 
nancial assets of eligibles are virtually the same as those of ineligibles, in both 
1987 and 1984. There was virtually no difference between the nominal hold- 
ings of other financial assets by  eligibles in 1984 and 1987. 
Our  analysis relies  on  the  exogenous  determination  of  40 1  (k) eligibility 
status, given income. It could be that the eligible group is composed dispropor- 
tionately of savers, who save more than the typical person, in all forms. There 
is little evidence, however, for this type of  heterogeneity  in saving behavior. 
As shown above, eligible and ineligible families had about the same level of 
other financial assets in  1987 and 1984. Thus the eligible group had not been 
saving more than the ineligible group, in other assets, as they would have  if 
they were disproportionately high savers, saving more in all forms. Moreover, 
those who were eligible for a 401(k) in 1984 had about the same level of other 
assets  as those who were eligible in  1987. In addition, among  IRA  savers, 
other assets do not differ by 401(k)  eligibility status. Whereas 401(k) eligibility 
10. The 1984 data do not show 401(k) asset balances. however, so that total assets of eligible 
and ineligible families can not be compared in that year. 129  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
Table 4.14  Median Asset Balances for Families with IRAs by 401(k) Eligibility and 
Income, 1984 and 1987 
Income (thousand $) 
Group  <I0  10-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-75  >75  All 
1987 
Not eligible for a 401(k) 
All financial assets  13,249 
Other assets  5,000 
IRA  6,000 
All financial assets  5,820 
Other assets  2,100 
IRA  2,000 
401(k)  0 




12,487  18,748 
5,900  9,630 

















15,228  21,000 
4,500  8,400 
5,900  6,700 


















Not eligible for a 401(k) 
All financial assets  7,200 
Other assets  2,525 
IRA  3,000 
All financial assetsd  - 
Other assets  3.100 
IRA  4,000 
401(k).'  - 




10,500  16,230 
5,700  9,300 

















-  - 
6,500  10,605 
3,400  4,000 

















.'401 (k) assets are not available for 1984. Dollar magnitudes are measured in current-year dollars for 1984 
and 1987. 
status may be determined exogenously,  IRA status is chosen by  individuals. 
Within either eligibility status, families with an IRA have substantially greater 
total financial assets than those without an IRA. This may reflect, in part, an 
individual-specific saving effect. Like other assets, however, IRA assets do not 
differ much by  401(k) eligibility  status, as shown in figure 4.5."  Thus these 
data suggest that 401(k) status is indeed largely independent of  overall saving 
propensity, given income. 
An additional source of information on the extent of substitutability between 
401(k), IRA, and other forms of financial saving is the change between  1984 
and  1987 in median asset balances, not controlling for income interval. The 
idea is to  consider  whether  the non-401 (k)-IRA assets-"other  assets"-of 
families with 401(k)s and/or IRAs declined between 1984 and  1987, as they 
would if  the tax-advantaged  saving substituted for other saving. The data are 
summarized  in table 4.15. The main  point  of  the data is that  there was  no 
change in  the other assets of  40l(k)-eligible families-whether  or not they 
contributed to an IRA. For example, the amount of  total financial assets of  all 
I  I. This seems to suggest little substitution between 401 (k) and IRA saving, consistent with the 
data in the previous sections that were graphed in fig. 4.2. 130  James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise 
Income Interval 
[m  Eligible  Not Eligible  I 
Fig. 4.5  IRA assets by 401(k) eligibility for families with an IRA, 1987 
families eligible for a 401(k) in  1984 was $5,000 (excluding 401(k) assets); 
families eligible in  1987 had  $10,330.12  But there was almost no change in 
other financial assets of  eligible families-a  slight  increase from $3,740 to 
$4,000. In contrast, the total (and other) financial assets of families not eligible 
for a 401(k) remained essentially unchanged over this period. 
The message is the same for 40l(k)-eligible families with an IRA and for 
those without an IRA: although total financial assets increased, other financial 
assets were essentially the same in  1984 and in 1987. The data reveal no hint 
of substitution. Among those not eligible for a 401(k), only those with an IRA 
experienced an increase in total assets-from  $16,250 to $19,646-and  for 
this group there was virtually no change in other assets. There was essentially 
no change in the assets of those without an IRA. 
Finally, the increase in IRA assets-for  families with these accounts-did 
not depend on 401(k) eligibility status. The increase for those not eligible for 
a 401(k) was from $4,500 to $7,500. For those who were eligible, the increase 
was from $4,500 to $8,000. Both the fact that both eligibility groups had the 
same level of IRA assets in  1984 and the almost identical increases suggest 
little substitution between 401 (k) and IRA assets. 
Throughout this section, we have focused on median asset levels, rather than 
on means, because the very large financial assets of a few families lead to mean 
12. The median 401(k) balance in  1987 was $1.000, and the median 1984 balance was probably 
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Table 4.15  Median Asset Balances for All Income Groups by 401(k) Eligibility 
and IRA Status, 1984 and 1987 
Group  1984  1987 
All families 
Not eligible for a 401(k) 
All financial assets 
Other assets 
IRA 
All financial assetsa 
Other assets 
IRA 
40 1  (k) 
Eligible for a 401(k) 
Families with an IRA 
Not eligible for a 401(k) 
All financial assets 
Other assets 
IRA 
All financial assetsa 
Other assets 
IRA 
40 I (k) 
Eligible for a 401(k) 
Families without an IRA 
Not eligible for a 401(k) 
All financial assets 
Other assets 
All financial assets" 
Other assets 
40  1 (k) 





































"Does  not include 401(k) assets in 1984. Entries are measured in current dollars in 1984 and 1987. 
asset levels that are much greater than the asset levels of the typical family. For 
example, the  median  of  total  financial assets of  families  not  eligible for a 
401(k) is $1,870, whereas the mean is $13,480. The median has the disadvan- 
tage, however, that medians of individual assets do not sum to the median of 
total assets, as means do. For example, the medians of the individual assets 
of all 40l(k)-eligible families with incomes over $75,000 sum to $45,204, but 
the median of  the total is $58,119. Mean values analogous to the medians in 
table 4.13 are presented in Appendix table 4B.2. The basic conclusions do not 
differ from the conclusions drawn from the median values. In fact, the differ- 
ence in the means between the two groups is close to the difference in the me- 
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4.5  Conclusions 
Our results suggest that 401(k) plans are a significant and increasingly im- 
portant component of retirement saving in the United States. Unlike IRA con- 
tributions, which  fell by  over 70 percent after the Tax  Reform  Act of  1986, 
401(k) contribution  levels have risen  throughout  the last decade. For many 
households, assets held through 401 (k)s represent more than half of their fi- 
nancial wealth. The high participation rate of those eligible for 401(k)s, cou- 
pled with the tendency for most households to reach retirement age with few 
financial assets other than Social Security and employer-provided pension ben- 
efits, suggests that these accounts will play a very important part in the eco- 
nomic security of  retirees in coming decades. 
Our findings suggest several important conclusions. First, the high 401  (k) 
participation rate of families whose employers offer 401 (k) plans suggests that 
payroll deduction and emulation of other employees may be important determi- 
nants of saving decisions. While only about  16 percent of all tax filers made 
IRA contributions at the height of their popularity, over 60 percent of persons 
eligible for a 401(k) contribute to the plan. Even in the lowest income groups, 
the participation rate is close to 50 percent. 
Second, the  data reveal  little  substitution  of 401(k) saving for either IRA 
saving or saving through traditional  saving vehicles. The data actually show 
substantial IRA saving even when 401(k) saving would appear to offer a higher 
rate of return. This casts doubt on the usual assumptions that all forms of sav- 
ing are treated as perfect substitutes and that all savers make “rational” sav- 
ing decisions. 
Third, the virtual cessation of IRA contributions by persons who lost the up- 
front tax deduction after the Tax Reform Act of  1986 suggests that such “atten- 
tion  getters” have an effect  on saving that  goes beyond  the  strict economic 
value of  the deduction. The importance of  promoting  saving is suggested by 
the finding that, after the  1986 legislation, even unaffected  persons  reduced 
their contributions by almost 50 percent. 
Fourth, the results suggest that 401(k) saving largely represents net new sav- 
ing. This conclusion rests on the comparison of the financial assets of 401(k)- 
eligible and 40l(k)-ineligible families and on the comparison of the assets of 
a random sample of 401(k) households in one year with the assets of a random 
sample of such households in a later year. 
This paper sets the stage for further, more formal analysis of 401(k) saving. 
A behavioral  model of household contributions to 401(k)s can in principle be 
used to simulate the effects of changes in the tax rules governing these plans 
or of changes in employer match rates. In  some circumstances, for example 
at the firm analyzed in Kusko, Poterba, and Wilcox (1  994), employer match 
rates change substantially from one year to the next. Economic conditions and 
other  factors  that  affect  these  rates  may  therefore  have  an  important  influ- 
ence on household  saving as 401(k) plans become a more significant saving 
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Another  important  question  regarding the rapid rise of 401  (k) plans con- 
cerns the extent to which these plans have replaced previous retirement saving 
plans. The 1988 GAO survey found that more than half of all firms with 401(k) 
plans also offer other saving vehicles, such as profit-sharing plans. At 61 per- 
cent of the firms in the GAO survey, the 401(k) plan was introduced as a new 
plan. For  29 percent of  the  firms, however, the 401(k) replaced  a previous 
profit-sharing plan, and in the remaining cases, it replaced other pre-existing 
saving arrangements (see U.S. GAO 1988b). In  1987, the 401(k) was the pri- 
mary plan of  only 26 percent  of participants  (see Andrews  1992). Unfortu- 
nately, the  published  survey results  provide  no  guidance on  the number  of 
workers who experienced plan replacements or on the extent to which 401(k) 
saving is simply a relabeling of  saving that previously was channeled to other 
types of retirement plans. 
Appendix A 
IRA Contribution Rates by 401  (k)  Eligibility 
We  estimate  two  ANOVA  specifications,  one to provide  estimates  of  the 
change in the IRA participation  rates between  1982 and  1987 and the other 
to provide estimates of  the difference  in the rates for 401(k) eligibles versus 
ineligibles in 1982 and 1987. The first specification, for the change in partici- 
pation rates, is of the form 
(All  C  = y, + ~(87)~  + e, + e(87), + E. 
This equation is estimated using data for individual persons, with C = 1 if the 
person  contributes  to an IRA and 0 otherwise.  We  denote different income 
intervals with subscript i, corresponding to the income groups in table 4.9. For 
each group, y  is the base rate for ineligibles in  1982, y(87) is the 1987 effect, 
e is the eligibility effect, and e(87) is the eligibility effect in  1987. For each 
income group, the IRA contribution  rates by year and 401(k) eligibility sta- 
tus-shown  in table 4.9-are  then given by 





4'  + ~(87) 
y  + e + ~(87)  + e(87) 
The results are shown in table 4A.l. The e(87) estimate of  -0.2950  for the 
highest income interval indicates that the fall in the IRA contribution rates for 
the eligibles was 0.2950 larger than the fall for the ineligible group, and the r- 
statistic of -2.8  indicates that this difference is statistically significant at stan- 
dard levels of  significance. 
The second specification, for the difference  in contribution  rates between 
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Table 4A.1  IRA Contribution Rates by 401(k) Eligibility Status (estimates of eq. 
[All) 
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Source: Authors’ estimates using the 1983 and 1988 CPS. See text for further description. 
(‘42)  C = y(82), + y(87), + e(82), + e(87)$  + E, 
where y(82) is the rate for ineligibles in 1982, y(87) is the rate for ineligibles 
in 1987, e(82) is the addition to the rate for eligibles in 1982, and e(87) is the 
addition for eligibles in  1987. In this case the IRA  contribution rates by  year 
and 401(k) eligibility status are given by 
1982  1987 
Ineligible  ~(82)  ~(82)  + e(82) 
Eligible  ~(87)  p(87) + e(87) 
The estimates are shown in table 4A.2. 135  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
Table 4A.2  IRA Contribution Rates by 401ik) Eligibility Status (estimates of eq. 
1.421) 
Variable  Parameter Estimate  Standard Error  &Statistic 
4’1  0.1186  0.0048  24.5 
f,  0.1607  0.0049  33.0 
Yi  0.2427  0.0064  38.2 
Y4  0.3679  0.0102  36.2 
YS  0.5046  0.0177  28.5 
Y6  0.5924  0.02  1 1  28.0 
Y7  0.6446  0.0292  22.0 
el  0.0904  0.0232  3.9 
e,  -0.0133  0.0173  -0.8 
e5  -0.0420  0.0436  -  1.0 
e7  0.2092  0.0958  2.2 
e2  0.0238  0.0 165  I .4 
e4  0.0239  0.0268  0.9 
e6  -0.0402  0.0554  -0.7 
~(871,  0.0722  0.0062  11.6 
~(87)~  0.0963  0.0054  17.9 
Y(871,  0.1578  0.0066  24.0 
fi87),  0.242  I  0.0144  16.8 
Y(87),  0.2655  0.0167  15.9 
~(87),  0.3725  0.029  1  12.8 
eW),  0.0558  0.0187  3.0 
e(871,  0.0259  0.0112  2.3 
47),  -0.0177  0.0109  -  1.6 
e(871,  -0.0082  0.0133  -0.6 
e(871,  -0.0700  0.0237  -2.9 
Y(871,  0.1831  0.0091  20.2 
e(87),  -0.0892  0.0198  -4.5 
471,  -0.0858  0.0394  -2.2 
Source: Authors’ estimates using the 1983 and 1988 CPS. See text for further description. 136  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
Appendix B 
Table 4B.1  Mean IRA and 401(k) versus Other Financial Asset Balances by Type 
of Asset Held, 1984 and 1987 
Group 
Excluding Stocks and  Including Stocks and 
Bonds  Bonds 
1984  1987  1984  1987 
Families with 401(k)  only 
Total assets 
Other than 401(k) 
401(k) 
Debt 
Families without 401(k) 
Total assets 
Families with IRA only 
Total assets 
Other than IRA 
IRA 
Debt 
Families without IRA 
Total assets 
Families with IRA and 401(k) 
Total assets 
Other than IRA or 401(k) 
IRA 
401(k) 
IRA and 40 1 (k) 
Debt 
Total assets 




































































Nore: Entries are measured in nominal  1984 and 1987 dollars. Table 4B.2  Mean Asset Balances by 401(k) Eligibility and Income, 1984 and 1987 
Income (thousand $) 
Group  <I0  10-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-75  >75  All 
1987 
Not eligible for a 401(k) 
All financial assets 
Other assets 
IRA 
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Comment  Jonathan Skinner 
The paper by Poterba, Venti, and Wise has two parallel goals. The first is to 
present heretofore unknown facts about 401(k) programs. Given the growing 
importance  of 401  (k) programs  for retirement  saving, such facts are highly 
useful and sometimes quite surprising. I would have never expected that half 
Jonathan Skinner is associate professor of  economics at the University of Virginia and a research 
associate of the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 139  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
of lower-income employees eligible for 401  (k) would contribute. By contrast, 
enrollment rates among lower-income families for Individual Retirement Ac- 
counts (IRAs) were less than 10 percent (Venti and Wise 1990). These simple 
tabulations are key pieces of evidence in thinking about the equitable design 
or expansion of tax-preferred saving programs. 
Another goal of this paper is to compare wealth accumulation among 401(k) 
contributors,  IRA contributors,  and the large fraction of  the population who 
avail themselves of neither program. Such comparisons are important in judg- 
ing the effect of 401(k)s on overall saving. Finding, for example, that contribu- 
tors to 40 l(k) programs have less in taxable assets (holding income constant) 
might  suggest  “shuffling,”  in  which  the  taxable  assets  are shifted  into  the 
401(k)s with no effect on overall wealth accumulation. While the authors are 
careful not to make claims that 401(k)s “cause” saving, the tabulations clearly 
show that 401(k) participants are avid savers in other assets as well. 
In my comments, I will stress two points. First, the authors seek to measure 
the interactive effects of both the IRA and the 401(k) programs. This inter- 
active effect is important for the design of policy if, for example, 401(k) plans 
substitute for IRA programs. As the authors stress, expanding IRA limits or 
eligibility could have minimal effects if the target population of savers are non- 
limit contributors to 401(k) plans. However, I am not convinced that the data 
are strong enough to measure this type of “crowding out.” That is, contributors 
to either a 401(k) or an IRA are a relatively select group of enthusiastic savers. 
Trying to distinguish between substitution effects of IRAs versus 401  (k)s, and 
differences in individual tastes for saving, is likely to strain the data. 
My second point is to suggest some additional tests from the authors’ data 
that might shed light on the question of  whether 401(k)s have any effect on 
saving behavior. The authors demonstrate that those who contribute to 401(k)s 
save more in other assets relative to those who do not. While such evidence 
is consistent with the view that 401(k)s encourage saving, it is by no means 
conclusive, since it may be the case that contributors are simply active savers 
among the employees that would have saved anyway in the absence of  the tax- 
preferred  saving plan. In this view, 401(k)s,  like IRAs, do nothing  for per- 
sonal saving. 
The advantage of  studying 401(k)s relative to studying IRAs is that some 
firms offer 401(k)s to their employers and others do not. Hence one can poten- 
tially compare the saving behavior  of  those eligible to contribute to 401(k)s 
with those who are ineligible, as Poterba, Venti, and Wise do. The question I 
address in more detail is, Are average saving rates of those who are eligible 
higher or lower than saving rates of those who are ineligible? 
This proposed test of whether 401(k)s stimulate saving can also be viewed 
as an instrumental variables (IV) estimator.’ Suppose that total wealth holding 
1. A good explanation of the IV approach is in Permutt and Hebel(l989).  For a similar applica- 
tion, see McClellan and Newhouse (1992). 140  James M. Poterba, Steven F.  Venti, and David A. Wise 
for family  i,  W,,  is a linear function of exogenous variables X,, such as age, 
earnings, family size, the availability of a 401 (k) program, and individual tastes 
toward saving v,, then 
= XJ3 + Z,Q,S + v,, 
where (3  is a vector of coefficients, Z, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
firm offers a 401(k) program, Q, is equal to 1 if the individual contributes to a 
401(k), and S is the net effect of the 401(k) saving program on wealth accumu- 
lation.? 
What does a comparison  of  contributors  versus  (eligible) noncontributors 
tell us? The average difference in wealth across groups can be written as 
where c and nc denote average for contributors and noncontributors,  respec- 
tively. Ignoring  observable  differences  in wealth  owing to (X,  -  X,,)p,  the 
difference in average wealth can be attributed to 6 + vo -  vnc,  the sum of the 
true effect of 401(k)s on saving plus the difference in tastes. The sum of these 
terms is large and positive, as the authors show. But there are a priori grounds 
for believing that 401(k) contributors  have a strong taste for saving, so one 
cannot separately determine the value of 6. 
A different test separates the data into those who are eligible to contribute 
and those who are not; 
where  e and ne denote those eligible  and not  eligible for the 401(k) plans, 
respectively,  and p  is the average fraction  of  those  eligible  who  contribute. 
Once again, the difference in wealth is the sum of the true effect of the 401(k) 
plan (times the percentage of people who enroll) plus the difference in average 
tastes toward saving. It is easier to argue that this latter difference should be 
zero, on average, unless there is strong self-selection among firms in choosing 
to institute a 401(k) plan. I will return to this issue below. 
The Poterba, Venti, and Wise paper contains the basic numbers necessary 
to make this instrumental variables calculation, although I cannot control for 
differences in observable characteristics (X,  -  X,,)P.  Table 4C.  1 shows median 
financial wealth by income (between $10,000 and $75,000) for those eligible 
and those not eligible for 401(k)s, taken from Poterba, Venti, and Wise's table 
4.13. The difference in 1987 financial wealth between those eligible and those 
not eligible, shown in row 3, is equivalent to p6 + v,  -  vne. If there is no self- 
selection of employees with a strong preference for saving into firms that offer 
401(k)s, so that E (v, -  vne} = 0, then the number reported in the third row of 
2. In this simple example, 6 is assumed constant. It might be expected to have a larger impact 
on wealth, the larger income and the more years of participation in the 401 (k). 141  401(k) Plans and Tax-Deferred Saving 
Table 4C.1  Median Financial Wealth by 401(k) Status and Income, 1984 and 
1987 
Income (thousand $1 
401(k) Statu5  10-20  20-30  30-40  40-50  50-75 
1987 
Eligible  1,190  4,000  9,205  12,650  25.343 
Not eligible  400  1.366  4.000  6,630  14.650 
Difference  790  2.634  5.205  6,020  10,693 
Eligible  550  2.075  4,450  6,850  16.268 
Not eligible  458  1,768  3,950  7.150  15.870 
Difference  92  307  500  -300  398 
I984 
Source: Poterba. Venti, and Wise (chap. 4 in this volume, table 4.13; unpublished data). 
Note: Financial assets in 1984 do not include 401(k) assets. 
table 4C. 1 is an estimate of p6.  For example, employees with income between 
$30,000 and $40,000 in firms that offered 401(k)s held $5,205 more in finan- 
cial wealth than those in firms without 401(k)s. Dividing through by p, which 
for this group is equal to ,618, yields an estimate of  6 = 8422. This simple 
calculation certainly suggests strong saving effects associated with 401(k)s. 
One objection to this inference, as noted above, is that there could be sys- 
tematic differences between employees of firms that go to the trouble of insti- 
tuting 401(k)s and employees of  those that  do not. One way  to test for this 
heterogeneity is to compare wealth of those eligible and those not eligible dur- 
ing 1984, a period when 401(k)s were still quite new and presumably had had 
little impact on overall wealth holdings. Median financial wealth comparisons, 
which unfortunately do not include 401(k) balances in 1984, are shown in table 
4C. 1, rows 4-6,  and are taken from unpublished data kindly provided by  Po- 
terba,  Venti, and Wise. There is little difference in median  financial wealth 
between those eligible and those not eligible during  1984, providing  at least 
some support for the notion that, at least in  1984, there were no systematic 
differences in  tastes for saving across the  two groups. On the  whole, then, 
these preliminary calculations provide some evidence that 401(k)s exert a real 
influence over saving decisions of households. 
This paper is the first of what I hope is a continued research program by  the 
authors on the saving effects of 401(k)s. These retirement programs ultimately 
hold greater promise, I think, for two reasons. First, 401(k)s provide an excel- 
lent natural experiment to test the hypothesis that tax-sheltered saving incen- 
tives affect saving. And second, based on the statistics presented in the Poterba, 
Venti, and Wise paper, 401(k) programs hold out at least a promise for encour- 
aging saving across a wide range of income groups. 142  James M. Poterba, Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise 
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